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THE NATIONAL GUARD IS MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF "JOINT" REQUIREMENTS THROUGH THE CONSOLIDATION OF ITS STATE, ARMY AND AIR GUARD HEADQUARTERS INTO ONE JOINT FORCES HEADQUARTERS.
Lieutenant General (LTG) H. Steven Blum, the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), at a Pentagon press conference on Friday, 16 May 2003, announced that the role of the National
Guard would transform to meet the new challenges facing our world today. 1 He stated, "So we will transform the National Guard, both the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, to be a joint team, a team with the five other services -the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard and the seven Reserve components, so that the citizens of our great nation get the best of all of their capabilities and the effects that a joint team can produce."
2 This paper will focus on the implications the transformation will have on the National
Guard. The transformation from its current headquarters to a joint force headquarters (JFHQ)
will have profound affects on the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the 54 states and territories. LTG Blum wants to ensure that the National Guard of the 54 states and territories, along with NGB, remains a ready and relevant force to defend our nation against emerging threats whether deployed overseas or here at home. 3 LTG Blum sees the National Guard continuing to answer the call for both federal and state missions. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) whether assigned under 10 USC or 32 USC, must continue to be that citizen-soldier prepared for any assignment whether they are deployed in support of homeland security or to a geographic or functional combatant command. 4 LTG Blum outlined two benefits that will come about as a result of this transformation.
The first benefit that will come from forming a single joint force headquarters will be to allow our citizen-soldiers to train as they fight, which is now more than ever as a member of a joint team.
5
Training as they fight will provide a greater opportunity for a seamless transition from citizensoldier to warfighter with little or no notice. 6 This training and experience our citizen-soldiers will receive working in a joint headquarters will provide a foundation for understanding their roles. This understanding is necessary because the Department of Defense (DOD) is increasing National Guard deployments that involve joint assignments.
In this paper, the term "National Guard" will include members of the ARNG and ANG of Under 32 USC the National Guard means, 'the ARNG and the ANG who are a land force and/or an air force, respectively, who are trained and whose officers are appointed under the sixteenth clause of Section 8, Article I, of the U.S. Constitution.' 9 This paper will look at the purpose for the National Guard transformation into the JFHQ and its impact on the states and NGB. To better understand the impacts, this paper will expound on the implications using doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) format. DOTMLPF is a joint term used to identify the domains within which capabilities are developed in response to guidance and operational needs. This guidance and operational needs are identified in our national strategies and visions.
10

BACKGROUND
In the previously referenced press conference LTG Blum indicated that the purpose for transforming the National Guard was to increase its "joint" capability. Right now, the National or Unit Manning Document (UMD). The second is, who is the identified executive agent that will provide administrative and resource funding for the JFHQ. The final implication is whom ever is the executive agent will provide funding for their appropriate Service personnel and equipment, however; the other Services, such as, the Army, Air Force, Marine, or Navy Reserve, will have to provide funding to the executive agent for their appropriate manpower and equipment within the JFHQ.
The National Guard at the state and territory level are funded and equipped through a NGB will have to consolidate these into a common JFHQ construct and seek guidance from JCS and then approval from OSD. This will probably take some time, but the issue is whether OSD will concur with NGB's proposed JFHQ construct. The implication here is that it could take several iterations between JCS and OSD for final approval of a JFHQ. Meanwhile, the states are implementing their construct without additional guidance. Hopefully, once the basic construct for the JFHQ is developed and approved it will document the entire organization using a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) .
The second issue, as described in the NGB JFHQ-ST Transformation Guidance, provides the states with a concept on how to develop a JTD that would establish the requirements for an organizational structure. 20 The JTD is the authorization document for the states and NGB will use to identify positions within the JFHQ. 21 The TAG has the latitude to fill JFHQ staff positions with personnel from the ARNG, ANG, the other Reserve forces, and federal, state, and local government agencies. The J-1 will form the JTD through the consolidation of both the Army's from the other RCs. 25 The JDA-R is for officers on Title 32 status assigned within the state JFHQ. 26 The assignment of a position to be "joint" or not on the JTD is based on emerging changes to DOD instructions. These changes are outlined in DODI 1215.20 and affect the Joint Duty Assignment-Reserve list. The JDA-R billets will be assigned in one of three categories.
The first category is a joint position that does not require JPME Phase 1. The second category is a joint position where JPME Phase 1 is required, and the third is a critical JDA-R position where JPME Phase 2 is required. JPME Phase 1 is completed if you are a captain or major and attended Command and General Staff College. Phase 1 for lieutenant colonels and higher is completed if you attended a senior service college or its equivalent. JPME Phase 2 is the threemonth advance JPME level course given at the Joint Armed Forces College. The DOD has developed a Distance Learning Education JPME Phase 2 course for Reserve officers who cannot get away from their civilian employment to attend the three-month AC course.
Under the JDA-R a position is considered joint if, "...the occupant shall be involved in the integrated employment or support of land, sea, or air forces, ..." 27 This indicates that a position within the JFHQ would have to allow the officer to employ or support the employment of forces.
NGB is not a command and control headquarters like Forces Command (FORSCOM), and Joint
Forces Command (JFCOM). Because NGB only has "channel of communications" responsibilities to the state National Guard forces there are three options that would change this for NGB. The first would be make NGB a link in the chain of command so that it can have command and control of forces much like combatant commands, FORSCOM, or designated Joint Task Forces. The second option could be to move NGB under NORTHCOM and be a Joint Force Headquarters-National Guard. This will allow NGB to perform its "channel of communications" function and take Tactical Command of National Guard forces mobilized for Homeland Security missions. The last option would be to merge NGB with NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). These last two options are probably the most realistic in that the National Guard is moving more into the homeland security realm that are overwhelmingly similar to the state missions National Guard forces perform now. These three options would require not only changes to 10 USC, but to regulations and the National Guard culture as well. Although these options are very controversial at best they will in the end meet the goal of the CNGB to have the National Guard remain "ready and relevant" to our military. 
MATERIEL
Within the materiel portion of the DOTMLPF there are two issues that will have some impact on the consolidation of the three headquarters into a single JFHQ. The first issue is property accountability and resourcing of the joint staff. The second impact is the functionality of the USPFO.
Normally the structure of an Army headquarters element is based on one of two documents. These are the TDA and Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE).
These documents are organized based on standards, rules, and guidance from the Department of the Army, force structure, and management organizations. They, in turn, develop doctrinally correct models of organizations that can be resourced properly. 30 The TDA or MTOE is then resourced with authorized equipment for specific positions or staff elements. The Air Guard uses different titles for their documents, one of which is the UMD that assigns personnel and equipment to a headquarters. These documents are approved at the highest level within their respective Services. The impact that will affect the National Guard is taking these TDAs, MTOEs, and UMDs and consolidating them into a JTD. The accountability of equipment will be established because it is assigned within the JTD. 33 The CNGB, by transforming the National Guard into a JFHQ, will enhance the availability, of National Guard officers to meet the joint assignment requirements now being developed by the OSD.
LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION
The JFHQ will, if approved, provide the joint positions that allow citizen-soldiers the opportunity to train as a part of a joint team. For a joint position to qualify as a joint duty assignment its duties and responsibilities must have three elements. First, the position must require the officer to work in the, "integrated employment or support" of forces. 34 This would require the officer to work on a portion of the staff controls forces provided for operations. This can be done at the state JFHQ, as National Guard units are often mobilized and deployed for state disasters and when protection of critical infrastructure is required. A second element that qualifies a position as a joint assignment is that this position must afford the officer the opportunity to integrate strategic and contingency planning. 35 This person would develop strategic plans dealing with future force structure of the National Guard. This person would also develop plans for hurricane disaster response, flood disaster response, support to law enforcement agencies for civil disturbances and the like. The final required element within an officers duties and responsibilities to make this position a joint position is to work within an headquarters that provides strategic level integration of national military strategies and their impacts on National Guard and other RCs. 36 Most officers are not aware of the requirements to have joint education and experience for promotion above the rank of colonel. The CJCS is actively involved in the development and implementation of joint education and experience requirements for National Guard officers.
These new joint requirements are not to burden the already difficult balance Title 32 officers face between their civilian employment and military career but to better prepare them for increasing mobilizations and deployments. Title 32 officers are now more than ever being mobilized and assigned into positions where joint training and education are necessary to assist in the seamless transition from the civilian employee to military staff officer. Thus, the DOD and the CJCS are trying to ensure that National Guard offices are, as much as possible, equal to their AC counterparts in the area of joint warfighting. 37 It is only recently that RC officers have been encouraged to meet similar AC regulations for promotion to general or flag ranks. 10 USC 668, defines a joint duty assignment as an assignment where the officer, "...gains significant experience in joint matters..." 38 The term "joint matters" is defined within the same code as, "...matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national military strategy; strategic planning and contingency planning; and command and control of combat operations under unified command. " 39 In the AC, 10 USC establishes the procedures for the promotion of officers. More specifically, Title 10 USC 619a, establishes that all officers on the active-duty list considered for promotion to flag or general rank must have completed a full-tour at a joint assignment and met their JPME requirements. 40 The RC officer promotion system was changed also. Per 10 USC 666, titled, Reserve Officers not on the active-duty list; the SECDEF must establish policies that require RC officers to have similar education and experience in joint matters in so far as is practical. 41 The DOD has also established further guidance on the promotion of RC officers to Because NGB guidance did not allow additional manpower the NGB and states' JFHQs will have unique considerations when filling positions with personnel. After the JFHQ manpower is complete excess personnel will be reassigned into the major subordinate commands under the JFHQ. There are two issues that must be addressed when moving personnel from one command to another with or without their consent. The first issue has to do with whether they are full-time. If so, there are union and compatibility issues that must be addressed, as explained earlier under the Organization domain. The second issue is that of compatibility.
Each position must be justified by manpower surveys and requirement models to ensure they are selected based on efficiency and effectiveness. 46 Not only must the positions be compatible to the headquarters staff element but also to the individual who is assigned within it. A staff position that will be a full-time position can only be filled with a full-time person whose duties and responsibilities match that of the position. If they do not, the employees have certain rights and must be retrained or moved to a similar position that they held prior to the reorganization.
FACILITIES
At this point in the IOC of the JFHQ there does not seem to be any significant issues with facilities. There is sufficient space within a state headquarters to provide for the joint staff.
Because many of the states will simply appoint an existing Army or Air National Guard officer with the additional duty to be part of the joint staff, there is no requirement to increase either the size or space within current HQ facilities.
OTHER NON-DOTMLPF IMPLICATIONS
The National Guard has two other issues that do not fall within the DOTMLPF domains. Thus, the issue before the state is who is going to be the executive agent for the JFHQ. The executive agent will provide the preponderance of funding while the remaining Services will have to transfer funding to the executive agent Service. Once NGB gets approval for the JMD, which is the consolidation of the JTD and funding required, and the EDATE is met, NGB will deactivate the current headquarters systems and activate the new JFHQ. 47 The NGB will work with the DOD to have a POM review to get JFHQ funding into the next POM cycle. 48 The USPFO has several functions within its structure that would come under different elements of the new JFHQ. Two of these functions are pay and allowance and the receiving and distribution of federal property. The USPFO is responsible for providing pay and allowances to the ARNG and ANG. This is also a J-1 manpower and personnel staff function.
The second function of receiving and distributing federal property is a function of the USPFO but would be also fall within the J-4 logistics staff functions. The impact of separating the USPFO and moving those elements under the appropriate joint staff function within the JFHQ would violate federal laws, one of which provides for the Property and Fiscal Officer to oversee the USPFO. Therefore, significant changes are required to 10 USC, 32 USC, DOD, Departments of the Army and Air Force, and NGB regulations to break up the USPFO. Perhaps it is time for the National Guard to identify and submit for approval all the required changes necessary.
CONCLUSION
The CNGB has a vision to change the command and control structure of NGB and State headquarters. LTG Blum indicated that he wants the National Guard to improve its joint warfighting capabilities by operating more like a joint military headquarters. To do this, the CNGB is requiring the 54 states and territories to consolidate their current structure of headquarters elements into one joint forces headquarters. The JFHQ will demonstrate the National Guard's commitment to remain "a ready and relevant force" 49 for our nation when our military is deployed as an element of national power.
Our citizen-soldiers are deployed more frequently than before. These deployments are placing ARNG and ANG officers into joint staff assignments that require joint training and education. Along with these deployments changes made by DOD are also aiding the transformation of the National Guard. This transformation will require joint experience now more than ever before for our citizen-soldiers.
The JFHQ implementation will require extensive effort by all to develop the manpower and resourcing necessary. By doing it now we will avoid making piecemeal changes to the joint staff in the future. NGB has some additional issues that the states do not have. The states have the structure and forces to meet the "joint matters" definition, while NGB does not, so changes to NGB and/or Title 10 U.S. Code must occur. While the transformation goals of the CNGB will require many changes, Title 10 U.S. Code is just one of those. The NGB and the states will consolidate its headquarters and dual-hat staff personnel so that they must perform both their joint and service staff functions. This transformation will in the end meet the benefits outlined by the CNGB. Our citizen-soldiers will greatly increase their joint experience and gain a better understand of how our military conducts joint warfighting, while also creating a similar structure that is understood by all DOD components.
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